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Some p r o j e c t i o n s and s p e c u l a t i o n s of The t u t o r i a l expounds t h e n o t i o n of s u r v e i l -I n o r d e r t o provide s e c u r i t y , t h e o p e r a t i n g When t h e INTRODUCTION Computer s e c u r i t y d e a l s w i t h t h e managerial procedures and t e c h n o l o g i c a l safeguards a p p l i e d t o computer hardware, software, and d a t a t o a s s u r e a g a i n s t t h e a c c i d e n t a l o r d e l i b e r a t e unauthorized a c c e s s t o and t h e dissemination of computer system d a t a . Computer privacy, on t h e o t h e r hand, i s *The work r e p o r t e d h e r e i n i s conducted a t The Ohio S t a t e University and Massachusetts I n s t i t u t e of Technology and supported by t h e O f f i c e of Naval Res e a r c h under t h e c o n t r a c t N00014-75-C-0573. concerned w i t h t h e moral and l e g a l requirements t o p r o t e c t d a t a from unauthorized a c c e s s and d i s s e w i n a t i o n . The i s s u e s involved i n computer privacy are t h e r e f o r e p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s regarding who may have a c c e s s t o what and who may disseminate what, whereas t h e i s s u e s involved i n computer s e c u r i t y
are procedures and safeguards f o r e n f o r c i n g the privacy d e c i s i o n s . The motivations f o r s e c u r i t y and privacy can b e found i n t h e d e s i r e f o r secrecy i n m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s , f o r non-disclosure i n indtst r i a l a p p l i c a t i o n s , and f o r information-sharing i n modern s o c i e t y . p a r t i c u l a r l y a c u t e where computers a r e used s i r c e computers p l a y a major and important r o l e i n proc e s s i n g and s t o r i n g of information. Several books on computer s e c u r i t y are a v a i l a b l e i n c l u d i n g [1,2, Figure 1 . n o t e t h a t through l e g i s l a t i v e measures privacy i s s u e s a f f e c t a l l a s p e c t s of computer s e c u r i t y With due c o n s i d e r a t i o n of i t s s o c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , l e g i s l a t i o n f o r computer privacy determines t h e type of information c o l l e c t e d and by whom, t h e type o. E a c c e s s and dissemination, t h e subject r i g h t s , t h e p e n a l t i e s , and t h e l i c e n s i n g matters.
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For r e s u l t s p r i o r t o 1974, t h e r e a d e r may ref er t o 154-581. s e c u r i t y measures are d e p i c t e d i n
Based on t h e l e g i s l a t i o n , i t i s then p o s s i b l e IO e s t a b l i s h some form of o p e r a t i o n a l secur:Lty. 'Che o p e r a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y allows t h e management of I computer i n s t a l l a t i o n t o e x e r c i s e contro:t and le r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n .
These motivations have become T h i s paper reviews more r e c e n t r e s u l t s s i n c e Through managerial control, the operational security allows the user to be physically close to the computer installation. Unless the computer system is physically secure, any further attempts to protect the computer system and system data will be futile. With proper identification and authentication, a user may gain access to a computer system.
Once the computer system begins its work for a user, security is facilitated at three levels: the hardware level, the software level, and the data level. In addition, if the computer system consists of terminals or several computers, then intercommunications between terminals and computers and among computers require security considerations.
One of the main goals of the computer software security has been the design and implementation of secure software systems. First, we need a design methodology for secure software (e.g., the security kernel approach). Second, we must be able to verify and to test that the software produced is indeed the software intended (e.g., proof of correctness and penetration tests). secure software which can carry out a wide range of security policies (say, separation of policy and mechanism). Once we have learned how to design and produce secure software, we can then implement various software mechanisms to achieve desired security.
The most unique aspect of the data security is where the semantics of (at least, some of) the data must be made confidential. Thus, the main concern in data security is safeguarding the confidentiality of the data semantics. To protect the confidentiality of the data, two principal problems must be resolved by the computer systems. The first is to conceal the data in user-computer and computercomputer communications (using cryptographic transformations); the second is to determine who can perform what operations on which data (providing access control). software or operating system security. The information presented herein is extracted from a larger monograph [3] . Because the operating system manages and controls the computer hardware resources whereas the other software (e.g., application programs) merely makes requests for resources, the issues involved in operating system security are critical and far-reaching [4-lo] .
Finally, we must have This paper concentrates on the problems of IDENTIFICATION AND SURVEILLANCE To manage and control the hardware resources, the operating system must be able to uniquely identify the resources. Devices and CPUs are always furnished with hardware identifications. Memory units can be identified by bounds registers, locks, or translation table entries. Stored programs and files can be identified by program names, program entries (or entry points), and file names. However, to provide security to the user of the resources, the operating systems must also identify the user. It must associate the user with those resources which were authorized for him. Furthermore, it must provide various protection attributes to be assigned to the resources during authorization. Finally, when requests are received during the course of a program execution, the operating system must identify the user who initiates the program and the resources requested, locate the protection attributes assigned to the resources, determine whether the request should be granted or denied, and carry out the granting or denying process.
Authentication
Since all software and hardware security mechanisms are based on the assumption that a user has a given identity, there must be some mechanism to authenticate this identity. Such a mechanism may be based on something the person knows, carries or is [11,123. A "combination" may be used in a lock or an electrical or mechanical pushbutton system. For computer access, such a system is called a pass_c word system [13-171. Problems with passwords are that they may be forgotten or stolen without the user becoming aware of the loss. In order to decrease the danger from stolen passwords, they must be changed frequently, thus leading to problems of creation and distribution. In a question-answer method, the user must answer one or more questions asked by the authentication system. For example, the user may have to perform some algorithm on some data given by the computer and then send the answer back to the computer. Because of its simplicity, password authentication is most commonly used in computer systems. Sometimes it is necessary to have a 2-way authentication, or handshaking, with the system authenticating itself to the user as well as the user to the system. some kind of card. Cards may contain optical bar codes or a Hollerith code. Plastic cards [18] with a magnetic strip or implanted magnetic slugs may also be used. Many such systems are commercially available.
Several systems based on characteristics of a user are available. In small installations, a guard may know and recognize all users. In a larger installation, a guard may compare a photocard with the actual face. Computerized facsimile systems [19] utilize this technique to store a photo of the user so that a guard can compare a live TV image with the stored image. At least one signature system is available to examine a signature, which must be written with known motion and style. Fingerprint systems 1201 are available which compare a fingerprint with a stored fingerprint. Other systems have been developed, based on hand geometry and voiceprints. These systems based on what a person is are much more complex than those based on something known or carried, since they involve a sophisticated pattern-matching operation. In addition to their expense, they have a second disadvantage in that they are much more likely to reject a legitimate user by mistake than is a system based on something known or something carried.
Something carried may be a standard key or Logging Whether in an interactive or batched processing system, logging 121J of all activity is mandatory. The operating system can then maintain an entry in the system log for the user. The entry records his ID; the source device(s) from which h i s commands, programs, and d a t a are e n t e r e d ; t h e s t a t u s of t h e d e v i c e ( s ) ; t h e s t a r t i n g time; t h e s t a t u s of h i s p r e s e n t processing s t a t e (e.g., program-in-execution, command-pending, e t c . ) , and p o i n t e r s t o o t h e r system d a t a which are unique t o t h i s user (e.g., g e n e r a l r e g i s t e r s c o n t e n t s , t h e real memory bounds, t h e l o c k s , o r t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e v i r t u a l memory t r a n s l a t i o n t a b l e ) .
which must be w e l l p r o t e c t e d . Although system l o g e n t r i e s may be purged when t h e user-system s e s s i o n i s over, t h e u s e r I D is n o t a p i e c e of temporary information. I n o t h e r words, t h e logging mechanism of t h e o p e r a t i n g system must be a b l e t o g e n e r a t e and maintain a permanent I D f o r each a c t i v e u s e r of t h e system.
Threat Monitoring o p e r a t i n g system is s t i l l r e s p o n s i b l e f o r monitori n g t h e requested o p e r a t i o n s i n progress. For example, i f t h e user is allowed t o a c c e s s a f i l e , i t i s one t h i n g t o allow him t o a c c e s s t h e f i l e with h i s own f i l e processing r o u t i n e and another t h i n g t o f o r c e him t o a c c e s s t h e f i l e w i t h t h e system r o u t i n e . The l a t t e r requirement enables t h e opera t i n g system t o c o n t r o l t h e manner w i t h which t h e resources are u t i l i z e d . ) Threat monitoring 1211 i s a means f o r achieving such c o n t r o l . Each r e s o u r c e may be a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a s u r v e i l l a n c e (system) program which w i l l b e a c t i v a t e d by t h e o p e r a t i n g syst e m f o r t h e purpose of a c c e s s i n g t h e r e s o u r c e on behalf of t h e user (program). I n Figure 2, w e d e p i c t such an environment.
The system l o g e n t r i e s are important d a t a , A f t e r r e q u e s t s a r e v e r i f i e d and granted, t h e The notion of t h r e a t monitoring can be extended t o allow t h e s u r v e i l l a n c e program t o have g r e a t e r a c c e s s r i g h t s i n order t o f a c i l i t a t e more e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l . T h i s extended n o t i o n i s known a s a m p l i f i c a t i o n 122-233. For example, i f we want t h e u s e r (program) t o l e a r n t h e average of many d a t a values i n a f i l e without l e t t i n g t h e u s e r rec e
i v e t h e i n d i v i d u a l d a t a v a l u e s , then t h e way f o r t h e o p e r a t i n g system t o c a r r y o u t such c o n t r o l b i t hout v i o l a t i n g t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e d a t a i s t o prclv i d e a system program t o do t h e average.
The p~o -gram can be executed by t h e u s e r but cannot be read o r modified by t h e u s e r , Furthermore, d i r e c t f i l e a c c e s s (such as read) i s n o t allowed f o r t h e u s e r . Without a m p l i f i c a t i o n , t h e only way t o safeguard t h e d a t a v a l u e s i s t o deny any a c c e s s t o t h e s e v a l u e s . Obviously, such a crude way of protect:.on e l i m i n a t e s some methods of u t i l i z i n g r e s o u r c e s : a an authorized manner.
C o n t r o l l i n g Requests and Grants
When a program i s being executed i n t h e coinp u t e r system, t h e program may make (1) r e a l o r v i r t u a l memory r e f e r e n c e s , (2) c a l l s f o r o t h e r programs, and ( 3 ) r e q u e s t s f o r f i l e s . Item (1) can b e taken c a r e of by t h e hardware i n real-time s i n c e t h e CPU must i n t e r p r e t t h e referenced addresses. Items (2) and ( 3 ) cannot b e handled by t h e hardware alone. They must be handled f i r s t by t h e o p e r a t i n g system. Conceptually, t h e o p e r a t i n g system maintains a t a b l e , known as t h e a c c e s s cont r o l matrix, where t h e row headings are u s e r IDS and t h e column headings are r e s o u r c e IDS, program names, program e n t r i e s , and f i l e names. The matrix e n t r y of row i and column j r e p r e s e n t
s t h e prot e c t i o n a t t r i b u t e s of t h e r e s o u r c e i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e j -t h column f o r t h e u s e r recorded i n t h e i -t h row. I n Figure 3 w e depica an a c c e s s c o n t r o l matrix where f o r example user U4 may execute program D and read o r append t o t h e f i l e D4.
cause ?he number of p o t e n t i a l u s e r s and a v a i l a t l e r e s o u r c e s , programs, and f i l e s is l a r g e , i t i s n o t possib1.e f o r t h e o p e r a t i n g system t o keep t h e e n t i r e a c c e s s c o n t r o l matrix i n t h e primary memory. Furthermore, t h e sheer s i z e of a c c e s s c o n t r o l jnformation r e q u i r e s c a r e f u l management by t h e o p e r a t i n g system. rows have i d e n t i c a l p r o t e c t i o n a t t r i b u t e s . Likew i s e , t h e 4-th and 5-th columns have i d e n t i c a l p r o t e c t i o n a t t r i b u t e s . Furthermore, t h e r e are many empty e n t r i e s . For implementation of t h e access matrix, c o n s i d e r a t i o n h a s been given t o W e n o t e i n Figure 3 t h a t t h e f i r s t and f o u r t h consolidating identical protection attributes by merging either rows or columns. Furthermore, there is no need to keep track of the resources and users which are not assigned any protection attribute. A capability-list oriented operating system 124-273 organizes the access control information by user IDS. In other words, its file subsystem creates, for each unique user ID, a capability list of authorized resource IDS and program and file names and their associated protection attributes. Whenever a*user logs on and is authenticated, the operating system enters the user ID into the system log. The file subsystem then retrieves the user's capability list. A pointer is generated by the operating system to refer to the location of the list and is inserted in the system log entry. This approach has the advantage that all known resources, programs, and files which are authorized to the user will have their IDS and names in the newly retrieved list, making it easy for subsequent verification of users' requests for resources, programs and data.
organizes the access control information by the resource IDS. Thus, for each resource (stored program, or file), the file subsystem creates a list of user IDS and their associated protection attributes. is received by the operating system during the course of executing a user's program, the ID of the resource is used by the file subsystem for retrieving the list, known as the access list. With the access list, the operating system can verify whether the requested operation satisfies the assigned protection attributes. The access list approach has the advantage that once a resource is requested, subsequent requests for the same resource by the same or other users can be verified and processed readily.
have shortcomings. the system or its protection attributes have been changed uniformly, such removals and changes must be reflected in the file subsystem through update. To update this information in the capability-list oriented operating system, an exhaustive search of every capability is required. This is time-consuming. On the other hand, if an existing user is to be barred from the system or his access to all resources are temporarily suspended without being specific about the naming of the resources, these changes should be readily recorded. information in the access-list oriented operating system, an exhaustive search of every access list is required. This is also time-consuming. The authority-item approach 1293 attempts to overcome these deficiencies by organizing the access control information into authority items, each of which corresponds to a user. Furthermore, every resource (program name, program entry, and file name) in an authority item is linked with the same resources (program name, entry, and file name) in other authority items. Thus, the authority-item approach supports capability lists directly and access lists indirectly through linkages.
Dissemination Control
An access-list oriented operating system [28] Whenever a request for some resource Both capability-list and access-list approaches When a resource is removed from
To record this
In addition to controlling access to resources, the operating system must control the dissemination of the results from an authorized program. In other words, a user program is monitored first to determine whether the program is authorized for the requesting user and second to determine if the data and other programs requested are authorized for the user program. Finally, when the computation is completed, the operating system must monitor the destination of the program output. For example, military systems require different levels (unclassified, confidential, secret and top secret) and different compartments (need to know) for the programs and data. ance allows access to top secret data. However, it should not normally be allowed to transfer this data to an unclassified file. Thus the operating system should monitor the output as well as the input so that the security of this data does not totally rely on the integrity of the top secret program.
information flow 152,531 from one security class to objects of another class have been modeled. These mechanisms allow a combination of compile time and run time verification that a program is not passing information to a file with a lower classification level.
A program with top secret clear-
Mechanisms that allow the restriction of Isolation
The purpose of isolation is to contain any security breach so that violation in one part of the system will not affect the other parts of the system. With multiplicity of software requirements for logging, access control and threat monitoring, the task of a modern operating system is quite complex. Such complexity and multiplicity can create system crashes and data spillages, which can lead to breaching of security. To reduce complexity and multiplicity of the tasks, approaches are used to partition the computer hardware and software into mutually exclusive parts, each of which may carry out its tasks in isolation. The underlying assumption is of course that, for the same amount of work, several independent small systems may create fewer security breaches than an all-embracing largz system.
Security VS. Cost
Whether the aforementioned assumption is true (or false) depends considerably on the ability (or inability) of the system designer to partition the hardware and software into mutually exclusive small systems. Hardware and program modules seem to lend themselves more easily to partitioning since we can always use duplicate modules and redundant hardware. The data, especially the shared data, are difficult to handle. Multiple copies of the data may create integrity problems in data update (e.g., for an update, some copies may have been completed; other copies may have not yet begun). also create inconsistency problems in data security (e.g., security requirements for different copies may negate or contradict each other). to problems in update integrity and security inconsistency, there are also the cost and performance to consider. Duplicate hardware units and program modules require additional costs.
They may
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Duplication of a r e s o u r c e tends t o e l i m i n a t e f i e r c e competition f o r t h e resource. Consequently, t h e r e i s t h e l i k e l i h o o d of r e s o u r c e u n d e r -u t i l i z a t i o n . The trade-off between c o s t and s e c u r i t y i s s t i l l an a r t which has eluded s e r i o u s s c i e n t i f i c s t u d y . The performance i s s u e is even more d i f f i c u l t t o grasp.
There i s no d e f i n i t i v e study which allows one t o compare t h e throughput of a c o l l e c t i o n of s m a l l systems v s . t h e throughput of a l a r g e s i n g l e system f o r t h e same amount of work.
Met hods
There are two i s o l a t i o n methods i n use. I n t h e f i r s t method, a l l u s e r programs are monitored by t h e same o p e r a t i n g system. However, each group of u s e r programs ( t h e r e f o r e , each u s e r group) i s r u n i n a s e p a r a t e primary memory p a r t i t i o n . Furthermore, i f t h e program module i s t o be used by two o r more u s e r groups, d u p
l i c a t e c o p i e s of t h e modu l e w i l l have t o be included i n t h e s e p a r a t e part i t i o n s . I n t h i s method, known as m u l t i p l e space method [ 3 0 ] , t h e redundancy of t h e hardware and modules c o n s i s t s of t h e primary memory and u s e r programs. On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e o p e r a t i n g system and i t s system modules are n o t d u p l i c a t e d . Furthermore, secondary s t o r a g e and communication t e r m i n a l s which a r e under t h e o p e r a t i n g system's c o n t r o l are a l s o n o t d u p l i c a t e d , Thus, t h e shared d a t a and system r e s o u r c e s are s t i l l monitored by t h e c e n t r a l o p e r a t i n g system. This method i s p a r t i c u l a r l y v i a b l e f o r a computer system w i t h m u l t i p l e v i r t u a l spaces. I n t h i s c a s e , each u s e r group occupies a p a r t of a v i r t u a l space. The remaining p a r t s of every v i r t u a l space are taken up by t h e o p e r a t i n g
system. I n Figure 4 , we i l l u s t r a t e an implement a t i o n of t h e method. 
The i n t e r e s t i n g e f f e c t i s t h a t t h e o p e r a t i n g system appears ( v i r t u a l l y ) i n every v i r t u a l space and i s s i t u a t e d a t t h e same p o s i t i o n s r e l a t i v e t o each u s e r program. Y e t , t h e r e i s only one copy of t h e o p e r a t i n g system. I n o t h e r words, t h e o p e r a t i n g system appears i n every v i r t u a l space without dup l i c a t i o n . The only p e n a l t y i n c u r r e d on t h e p a r t of t h e u s e r i s t h a t t h e p a r t of v i r t u a l space occupied by t h e o p e r a t i n g system is n o t a v a i l a b l e t o
t h e u s e r programs. The u s e of a c e n t r a l o p e r a t i n g system e n a b l e s t h e computer system t o have a unif i e d logging, a c c e s s c o n t r o l , and monitoring mechanism f o r s e c u r i t y purposes. However, t h e complexity and m u l t i p l i c i t y of t h e o p e r a t i n g syst e m h a s n o t been reduced. Furthermore, i f t h e "big brother'' i s p e n e t r a t e d , a l l t h e u s e r v i r t u a l spaces and i s o l a t i o n s w i l l be breached. t h a t each u s e r group may have i t s own o p e r a t i n g system and s e v e r a l o p e r a t i n g systems may e x i s t cln t h e same computer system. This concept i s known as t h e v i r t u a l machine concept [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] The VMM can emulate a computer system environment f o r a p a r t i t i o n so i.hat t h e o p e r a t i n g system and i t s a s s o c i a t e d u s e r programs running i n t h e p a r t i t i o n may c o n s i d e r t h e emulated environment as i f i t is a stand-alone computer system. Normally, t h e VMM of a l a r g e computer system may emulate s e v e r a l small computer systems, each of which i s a member of t h e computer family o r series ( s e e F i g u r e 5 ) . w i t h t h e CPU of t h e h o s t machine ( i . e . , IBM 3701168 i n t h i s c a s e ) , keeps t r a c k of t h e virtual machiies being emulated on t h e h o s t computer (e.g., by having t h r e e Program Counters), and t r a n s l a t e s i n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e v i r t u a l machines i n t o equival e n t i n s t r
u c t i o n s of t h e h o s t machine f o r execution I n t h i s way, t h e h o s t machine may run t h e M T (multiprogramming w i t h f i x e d number of t a s k s )
o p e r a t i n g system f o r t h e 3701135 v i r t u a l machinz, t h e TOS/DOS ( t a p e and d i s k -o r i e n t e d o p e r a t i n g system) for the 360150, and the BOS (basic operating system) for the 360130. It is interesting to note that, in this example, the 3701168 is a machine of virtual memory (do not confuse with the term machine) capability. In order to support either 360130 or 360150 (neither of which has virtual memory capability), the host machine is actually using its virtual addresses to emulate physical locations of the real memory of the 360130 or 360150. Thus, the address spaces of different virtual machines are also separated (by virtue of being supported in different virtual spaces of the host machine). This isolation technique has several advantages. (1) It allows different operating systems to be used for different security and processing requirements. ( 2 ) Any security breach of one operating system will not affect the other operating systems and their corresponding user programs. (3) The virtual machine monitor (VMM) is small, making it difficult to penetrate and less likely to malfunction, There are, nevertheless, some fundamental limitations. One of the most important limitations is that the host machine can only emulate machines within the family or series. Another important limitation is that no two virtual machines can share a common data base, since these virtual machines are in "total" isolation and do not communicate to each other. The third limitation is that the virtual machine capability requires considerable hardware duplication. This is particularly evident in terms of 110 devices, since every virtual machine must have its peripherals which are real and are difficult if not impossible to emulate. dation of performance. Since each virtual machine is emulated, its performance is usually not as good as its real computer counterparts, and certainly not as good as its "upward" replacements.
The last liuitation causes a degra-
Design and Implementation Of Secure Operating Systems
The operating system, which enforces protection of physical resources, program usage, and data access, must be secure itself. In other words, even if we know what algorithms and techniques are specified for logging, access control, monitoring, and isolation, how do we know that the software design will meet these specifications? Furthermore, if we accept the design, how can we be sure that the software produced implements the design intended? Verification Verification methods 1361 are used for checking the correctness of the software designs against algorithm (or program) specifications, and for checking the correctness of the software programs against their original designs. Unless the specifications are in error, the process of verification will make sure the software designed and program produced meet the intent of the specifications. The emphasis on intent is important. In software, specifications are seldom given as ways and procedures to produce the software products. Instead, specifications are mostly requirement and property statements. It is up to the designers to devise algorithms to meet the requirements and properties and the implementors to write programs to computerize the algorithms. The verification methods must be used to assure that the programs meet the intended requirements and properties. the inductive assertion technique. As an example of how one proceeds to associate assertions with the program statements and to construct proofs of correctness, consider the flowchart shown in Figure  6 .
One of the popular verification methods is The boxes labeled INITIALIZATION, LOOP-BODY, and FINALIZATION are intended to be loop-free program segments, and LOOP-TEST is a simple predicate whose truth is the condition for loop termination. The basic steps are as follows:
(1) We make the first assertion P, called input assertion, at the program entry. Typically, the input assertion indicates the domain or joint constraints among the input variables. The loop assertions are required to construct proofs of correctness of the loops. For each possible path between two assertions, a lemma must be proved. This lemma must show that the program statements that are executed between the assertions do not make those assertions false. We say that the program statements between two assertions are proved correct if the program statements do not invalidate either assertion. We call this lemma that must be proven a verification condition. Thus, verification conditions must be proved to insure that program statements between a s s e r t i o n s do not f a l s i f y those a s s e r t i o n s .
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e proof of t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s , we must a l s o prove t h a t every loop of
t h e program w i l l e v e n t u a l l y terminate. prove t h a t a loop does t e r m i n a t e i s q u i t e simple. By t h e statement of t h e loop t e s t , we know under what c r i t e r i o n t h e loop w i l l terminate. By express i n g t h i s c r i t e r i o n as an a s s e r t i o n , w e need only prove, a t some p o i n t during t h e execution of t h e loop body, t h e a s s e r t i o n w i l l be t r u e . W e w i l l c a l l t h i s lemma a loop terminating condition. For a sample program depicted i n Figure  7 , t h e r e a r e f i v e c o n d i t i o n s ; one f o r t h e input a s s e r t i o n , one f o r t h e output a s s e r t i o n , one f o r t h e loop a s s e r t i o n where t h e loop test is f a l s e , one f o r t h e loop a s s e r t i o n where t h e loop t e s t i s t r u e , and one f o r t h e loop termination c o n d i t i o n . Program of Two Non-zero P o s i t i v e I n t e g e r s Using Repeated Addition Although program v e r i f i c a t i o n i s a n e c e s s i t y i n producing s e c u r e software, t h e r e are l i m i t a t i o n s t o t h e i n d u c t i v e a s s e r t i o n techniques.
(1) Comparing t h e loop a s s e r t i o n i n Figure 6 w i t h t h e loop a s s e r t i o n i n Figure 7 , t h e s e two loop a s s e r t i o n s are a t t a c h e d a t d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s . W e n o t e t h a t t h e program can be v e r i f i e d by using e i t h e r placement without t h e o t h e r . However, f o r more complicated program l o g i c , t h e placement of an a s s e r t i o n i s c r i t i c a l . Clever placements of a s s e r t i o n s may r e s u l t i n s h o r t e r proofs and i n simpler inductions. ( 2 ) I f a program u s e s more complex d a t a s t r u ct u r e s such as m u l t i p l e l i n k e d l i s t of d a t a elements, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o develop proofs and e x e r c i s e i n d u c t i o n s on t h e d a t a s t r u c t u r e s d i r e c t l y . I n s t e a d , an equiva l e n t d a t a s t r u c t u r e may have t o be introduced t o expedite t h e proofs and inductions. Thus, we have n o t v e r i f i e d t h e o r i g i n a l d a t a s t r u c t u r e s . Rather, we v e r i f y something we b e l i e v e t o bc equiva l e n t . ( 3 ) For any p r a c t i c a l program, t h e r e s u l t i n g proof is longer than t h e program, making
program v e r i f i c a t i o n a t e d i o u s arid e r r o rprone process. I t i s n o t clear whethet h i s property i s i n h e r e n t i n t h e induc:ive a s s e r t i o n technique o r i s a g e n e r a l limit a t i o n of t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n techn.ique.
The Kernel Concept l a r g e and complex, and s i n c e v e r i f i c a t i o n methods tend t o produce long proofs, v e r i f i c a t i o n of t h e e n t i r e o p e r a t i n g system may n o t be p o s s i b l e o r even d e s i r a b l e . It i s t h e r e f o r e hoped t h a t perhaps one can i s o l a t e t h o s e few p r i m i t i v e s which are e s s e n t i a l t o t h e s e c u r e o p e r a t i o n of t h e o p e r a t i n g system. By implementing t h e s e p r i m i t i v e s i n t o program modules and then v e r i f y i n g them r i g o r o u s l y , i t is hoped t h a t t h e e s s e n t i a l s e c u r i t y of t h e o p e r a t i n g system can be assured even i f t h e rest of t h e system has n o t been v e r i f i e d . The d i f f i c u l t y i n pursuing t h i s concept i s t h e d e f i n i t i o n of t h e concept i t s e l f . I n o t h e r words, what c o n s t i t u t e s t h e k e r n e l I 2 4 , 2 7 , 3 7 -4 6 ] of a r o p e r a t i n g system? A s we have seen from p r e v i o l s d i s c u s s i o n , t h e computer system s e c u r i t y depencs upon t h e s e c u r i t y of real, v i r t u a l , and secondEry memories, and on t h e f i l e subsystem. I n a d d i t i o n , i t depends on t h e s e c u r i t y of t h o s e modules which perform logging, a c c e s s c o n t r o l , and t h r e a t morti t o r i n g . Thus, t o a l a r g e degree, t h e k e r n e l cif t h e o p e r a t i n g system may have t o i n c l u d e t h o s e modules which manage and c o n t r o l t h e real, v i r t u a l , and secondary memories, maintain and s e a r c h t h e f i l e subsystem, and perform a c c e s s c o n t r o l s and t h r e a t monitoring. Since most of t h e system modules a r e interdependent, t h e s i z e of t h e k e r n e l tends t o be l a r g e . One study shows t h a t t h e s w u r e k e r n e l of a general-purpose o p e r a t i n g system con-
sists of approximately 30,000 l i n e s of pxogram statements. This i s n o t promising [ 4 4 ] .
E f f o r t s have been d i r e c t e d t o re-examine :he s t r u c t u r e and design of t h e o p e r a t i n g system wlth a view toward a r e d u c t i o n of t h e number of dependencies among system modules, and t h e developmt?nt of more e x p l i c i t module i n t e r f a c e s f o r c h a r a c t % -i z i n g t h e dependencies.
It is hoped t h a t w i t h fewer dependencies and c l e a r e r i n t e r f a c e s , t h e s i z e of a s e c u r e k e r n e l can b e reduced c o n s i d e r a b l x Since t h e o p e r a t i n g system i s always very P e n e t r a t i o n Tests tem designer and implementor t o claim t h a t t h e system i s a c o r r e c t product. However, a c o r r e c t product may be a "weak" product i n t h a t t h e r e a r e h o l e s and s p o t s whose s e c u r i t y can be breached e a s i l y . This is n o t t h e f a u l t of t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n methods. I n f a c t , i f t h e o r i g i n a l s p e c i E i c a t i o n s have h o l e s and i f t h e designer and implementor are not too b l i n d t o discover them, t h e s e are t h e "correct" h o l e s being designed and implemented i n t o t h e o p e r a t i n g system. V e r i f i c a t i o n methods a l l o w t h e o p e r a t i n g sys-A p e n e t r a t i o n test [30, [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] ] is used to identify the holes and weak spots. One of the requirements in conducting the penetration test is that the design and program logic of the operating system is assumed to be known to the penetrator. In fact, in many penetration studies, the design and program documentation are provided to the testers (the professional penetrators). Extensive and concerted penetrations may allow the designer and implementor to fix up the holes and patch up the weak spots.
basis of their intensity and comprehensiveness, allow the security certification of an operating system with some quantitative measures or scales. At their least, the tests may answer a series of yes, no, or maybe questions for a checklist of penetration possibilities. Whether an operating system is certified by a scale or by a checklist, the idea is to gain some degree of security confidence in the operating system. On the other hand, certifying absolute security (i.e., complete confidence in the system) on the basis of penetration tests is not possible, since there may always be another penetration test which has been overlooked.
At their best, penetration tests may, on the
Conclusion
We would like to emphasize that computer security and privacy cover a broad range of problems and issues which make the implementation of the security measures complex. Without a thorough understanding of the problems and issues involved, attempts to provide solutions in isolated areas may render the computer security inadequate. In this paper, we have tried to survey the spectrum of operating system security so that its complexity and comprehensiveness are put in some perspective.
